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PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN
COUNSEL AND THE CORPORATE CLIENT
ROBERT G. MARKEY* AND CRAIG S. BONNELL**
I. INTRODUCTION
A TTHE DIRECTION OF the Upjohn Company's top management, the
company's in-house and outside counsel conducted an internal in-
vestigation of payments made by Upjohn and its subsidiaries to officials
of 136 foreign countries in which the company conducted business. The
investigation was initiated by management over concern that the
payments had not been properly reported to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC). In United States v. Upjohn,' the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's holding that Upjohn's
attorney-client privilege was waived with respect to facts disclosed to
the SEC. In addition, according to the Court of Appeals, documents not
originally furnished to the SEC could be subject to disclosure pursuant
to an Internal Revenue Service summons despite a claim of attorney-
client privilege
Upjohn was accepted by the United State Supreme Court on cer-
tiorari jurisdiction.' The case was argued before the Court on November
5, 1980. In deciding the case, the Court will be providing guidance on the
attorney-client privilege as applied to corporations, an area of many
distinct problems and limitations because of the nature of the entity
claiming the privilege. The Court may also set boundaries as to the ex-
tent to which the attorney work-product doctrine may be used to ex-
empt documents from pre-trial discovery.
At present inconsistent lower federal appellate court decisions gover-
ning the use of the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine
apply to the discovery of communications between counsel and the cor-
porate client. Because of the distinctions that have developed in the ap-
plication of the corporate attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine due to the unique factual settings in which the issues have
arisen, prior case law may not be totally preempted by the Supreme
Court decision in Upjohn. This article will explore some of these
divergent opinions to determine the probable effect that the Court's
* A.B., Brown University; J.D., Case Western Reserve University. The
author is a partner in the law firm of Arter & Hadden, Cleveland, Ohio.
** B.A., Cleveland State University; J.D., Cleveland State University,
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. The author is associated with the law firm of
Thompson, Hine & Flory, Cleveland, Ohio.
600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1310 (1980) (No.
79-886).
Id at 1227-28.
United States v. Upjohn Co., 100 S. Ct. 1310 (1980) (No. 79-886).
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decision in Upjohn will have upon communications between counsel and
the corporate client.
II. THE EXTENT OF THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege generally protects from disclosure the
substance of confidential communications made by the client in seeking
the advice of legal counsel.' With the exception of two extraordinary
situations in which the privilege cannot be invoked,5 the client's com-
munications to his lawyer for the purpose of procuring legal advice are
privileged. The attorney's advice to the client, however, is open to
disclosure.'
The modern theory of the attorney-client privilege is to promote
freedom of consultation with legal advisors by prohibiting disclosure ab-
sent the client's consent.' The application of the privilege to the in-
animate, artificial entity represented by the corporation creates dif-
ficulties in determining (1) which corporate agents have the power to in-
voke the privilege and (2) the scope of the information for which a
responsible agent may invoke or waive the privilege
A. Identification of the "Client"for Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege
Certain communications between a corporation and its attorney are
privileged from disclosure. This application of the attorney-client
1 8 J. WIGMORE. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2292 (Rev. ed. 1961). Wigmore has
provided probably the most oft-cited formulation of the privilege. He maintains
that the following conditions must exist if the privilege is to be established and
the communications protected: (1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2)
from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications
relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at this in-
stance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal ad-
viser, (8) except the protection be waived. Id.
I The first exception to the attorney-client privilege occurs when "[Clom-
munications [are] made by a client to his attorney during or before the commis-
sion of a crime or fraud for the purpose of being guided or assisted in its commis-
sion. . . ." Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1102 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1972), on remand 56 F.R.D. 499 (S.D. Ala. 1971). See also
Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md. 1974). The second situa-
tion which renders the privilege inapplicable occurs when "the same attorney
acts for two or more parties having a common interest . . . [and one]
subsequently] [becomes embroiled in a] controversy with the other." Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d at 1103.
1 SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 515 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed,
534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing Natta v. Zletz, 418 F.2d 633, 637-38 (7th Cir.
1969)); United States v. IBM, 66 F.R.D. 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The attorney may,
however, be able to prohibit discovery by application of the work-product excep-
tion. See notes 95-123 infra and accompanying text.
1 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, at § 2291. But see, ABA, Proposed Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, R. 1.13 (Jan. 1980).
' United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1226 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
granted, 100 S. Ct. 1310 (1980) (No. 79-886).
[Vol. 28:565
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privilege to a corporation was not recognized in the district court deci-
sion of Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n9 primarily because
the court could not identify the nebulous "client" who could act on
behalf of the organization to invoke the privilege." Radiant Burners was
reversed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals which held to the pre-
existing assumption that the attorney-client privilege extends to cor-
porations without defining the "client" who could invoke the privilege
on behalf of the entity.1
The importance of identifying and defining the client in the corporate
setting is crucial because the scope of the attorney-client privilege is
narrow. Any portion of a privileged communication which discloses fac-
tual information furnished by a witness (one other than the client) is not
protected. 2 Even though it did not acknowledge a corporate privilege,
the Radiant Burners trial court recognized the identification of the cor-
porate alter ego problem inherent in the application of the attorney-
client privilege to a corporation. Courts have uniformly held that com-
munications made to counsel by a member of top management who
guides and integrates the corporation's several operations, are privi-
leged.1 "The difficulty arises when, after the attorney-client relation-
ship has been established by the top management, communications are
made to counsel by subordinate corporate agents and employees."' 4
In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,15 an early case deal-
ing with the corporate attorney-client privilege, the court granted a
blanket extension of the privilege to all employees of the corporation
without delineating the extent of the privilege among various classes of
employees. This broad shield could theoretically prohibit the divulgence
9 207 F. Supp. 771, 773 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
'0 Determining that the corporate entity is best represented by its
shareholders, the court denounced the anomaly that would exist if the privilege
were extended to cover potentially thousands of "clients":
[Ilt becomes apparent that the confidential nature of communications
and documents so vital an element of the attorney-client privilege could
never exist when such documents and information are readily available
to so many thousand persons, whose qualifications for the most part are
solely a monetary interest. Indeed, since all of the activities of every cor-
poration are only for the common or group interest, it can never assert a
reasonable or proper claim of secrecy.
Id at 775.
" Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n., 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
" Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947). See also 8 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 4, at § 2318.
3 E.g., United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d at 1226; Natta v. Hogan, 392
F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968).
" United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d at 1226.
89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
19791
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of any corporate wrongdoing by making corporate counsel a repository
for any questionable facts related to company operations."6 United
Shoe's blanket extension has been replaced by a variety of tests
developed by the federal courts in subsequent decisions which restrict
the classes of persons within a corporation who can claim or waive the
attorney-client privilege on behalf of the entity.
1. The Control Group Test
The control group test followed by the Sixth Circuit in Upjohn protects
communications between corporate counsel and the individuals respon-
sible for making decisions within the organization after legal advice has
been procured.17 Employees in this protected class are the individuals
"in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision
about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of an
attorney."'8 Thus, all members of the group with authority to act on the
legal advice are members of the control group. City of Philadelphia v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.9 gives the following illustration of a con-
trol group member:
An example might be the head of the Claims Department, who
frequently has authority to settle damage claims without any ac-
tion by the Board of Directors or the chief officers, or without
their ever being advised of it. In such [a] case, the communica-
tion would be privileged because the claims executive was the
person who could act upon the lawyer's advice and he was the
person receiving it."0
In addition to the Sixth Circuit's use in Upjohn, the control group test
has recently been adopted by the Third Circuit.2 The Second Circuit has
yet to adopt any particular test but tacitly embraced the control group
test in affirming a decision by the District Court for the Southern
District of New York.
22
The control group test encourages free and open communications be-
tween the members of the group and corporate counsel. Its use is gener-
ally predictable test because of the definition in terms of lines of respon-
sibility. Unlike the other tests discussed below, which concentrate in dif-
'e United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d at 1227.
Employees in the protected class are not necessarily the same people con-
sidered controlling for purposes of federal securities laws. See, e.g., Securities
Act of 1933, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1976).
" City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485
(E.D. Pa. 1962), mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom., General Electric Co.
v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
'0 Id. at 485.
'0 Id. at 486.
" In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979).
" In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1979).
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ferent degrees on the subject matter of the communication, the control
group test does not rely on the circumstances surrounding the com-
munication but focuses on the person seeking the legal advice.28
2. The Subject Matter or Harper & Row Test
In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker24 counsel for one of the
defendant-petitioners had prepared memoranda while "debriefing"
employees and former employees shortly after each person had testified
before a grand jury. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that
no personal attorney-client privilege could be invoked by the inter-
viewees because of the absence of an individual attorney-client relation-
ship. In determining whether the interviewees could avail themselves of
the corporation's attorney-client privilege, however, the Harper & Row
court dismissed the limitations of the control group test in favor of the
creation of a subject matter test:
We conclude that an employee of a corporation, though not a
member of its control group, is sufficiently identified with the
corporation so that his communication to thie corporation's at-
torney is privileged where the employee makes the communica-
tion at the direction of his superiors in the corporation and
where the subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is
sought by the corporation and dealt with in the communication
is the performance by the employee of the duties of his employ-
ment.25
The Harper & Row test has been criticized for the encouragement it
provides to top management to shield itself from knowledge of cor-
porate wrongdoing. Once top management becomes aware of the legal
problems surrounding a transaction, it can instruct an employee to com-
municate directly with the corporation's attorney." The decision-making
I The control group test has been criticized as discouraging corporations
from conducting internal investigations. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599
F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979) and authorities cited therein. The Third Circuit scoffed at
this criticism:
We do not doubt that the ability to conduct a confidential investigation
would make "compliance with laws governing corporate activity" more
paltable, see Report of the Committee on Federal Courts, supra; we do
doubt, however, that a corporation would risk civil or criminal liability
under those complex laws by foregoing introspection. In our opinion, the
potential costs of undetected noncompliance are themselves high enough
to ensure that corporate officials will authorize investigations regardless
of an inability to keep such investigations completely confidential.
Id. at 1237.
423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), aff'd per curiam by an equally
divided court, 400 U.S. 348, rehearing denied, 401 U.S. 950 (1971).
Id at 491-92 (emphasis added).
Upjohn criticized the subject matter test:
The "subject matter" test encourages senior managers purposely to
1979]
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power resides with management, of course, and thus it remains this
group's right to act on any legal advice procured by the communication.
The attorney-client privilege, acting as a possible bar to discovery 7 is
thereby invoked by a group of employees who may not even be aware of
the results of the privileged communication on the corporation.
3. The New Tests-Relevancy and Modified Harper & Row Analysis
Within the last several years, federal courts have developed standards
for determining the extent of corporate attorney-client privilege that
examine both the position of the employee within the organization and
the subject matter of the information in question. The pre-existing con-
trol group and Harper & Row tests have been combined to create new
standards based on the relevance of the communication to the legal pro-
blem addressed.
In In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation28 Judge Richey of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the
attorney-client privilege may not be claimed in a corporate context
unless the following requirements are met:
(i) The particular employee or representative of the corporation
must have made a communication of information which was
reasonably believed to be necessary to the decision-making pro-
cess concerning a problem on which legal advice was sought;
(ii) The communication must have been made for the purpose of
securing legal advice;
(iii) The subject matter of the communication to or from an
employee must have been related to the performance by the
employee of the duties of his employment; and
(iv) The communication must have been a confidential one .....
Judge Richey found this test preferable to the control group and
Harper & Row tests because it preserves privileged communications in
ignore important information they have good business reasons to know
and use. Corporate counsel should not be the exclusive repository of
unpleasant facts.
The "subject matter" approach enables the corporation's
management-via agents-to "communicate" to counsel the details of
transactions about which management is only dimly aware and to have
these communications protected by the attorney-client privilege. Thus,
once management is informed in a general way of transactions posing
legal problems, it can order subordinate agents to communicate the full
details directly to counsel.
United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d at 1227.
United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 282 (6th Cir. 1964).
25 F.R. Serv. 2d 1248 (D.D.C. 1978) (emphasis added).
" Id at 1254 (citations omitted and emphasis added). Judge Richey later ap-
plied this test again in the same litigation. [1978-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 162,105
(May 8, 1978).
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol28/iss4/4
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
a proper context but prevents middle managers and virtually any
employee from hiding behind Harper & Row by making otherwise un-
protected communications with each other through the attorneys. Rele-
vant communications are those that are considered necessary to the
solution of the legal problem at the time made rather than extraneous
information that later becomes relevant in resolution of the problem."
The Eighth Circuit, in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith,"
adopted what the court considered as a "modified Harper & Row" test:
[Tihe attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee's
communication if (1) the communication was made for the pur-
pose of securing legal advice; (2) the employee making the com-
munication did so at the direction of his corporate superior; (3)
the superior made the request so that the corporation could
secure legal advice; (4) the subject matter of the communication
is within the scope of the employee's corporate duties; [andl (5)
the communication is not disseminated beyond those persons
who, because of the corporate structure, need to know its con-
tents."
The primary difference between Diversified's test and the Harper &
Row test is the requirement that a reasonable belief exist that the infor-
mation communicated and subsequent legal advice are necessary to
decide upon a course of action. The Harper & Row test requires only
that an employee request advice at the direction of a superior and that
the advice deal with the performance of the employee's duties." In
order to prevent channeling of all corporate communications to at-
torneys, Diversified puts the burden of proof on the employer to show
that the communications meet all of the requirements, including that
the communication was made for the purpose of seeking legal advice
and is not disseminated beyond those who need to know its contents.3
Thus, the receipt of a routine report by corporate counsel would be pro-
tected under the Harper & Row test and, if relevant, under the Am-
picillin test, but not under Diversified "either because the communica-
tion will have been made available to those who do not need to know or
because the communication was not made for the purpose of securing
legal advice."' '
The standards enunciated by Ampicillin and Diversified are consis-
tent with the objectives of protecting disclosures made in procuring
See id. at 1255 n.8.
31 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
Id at 609.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348, rehearing
denied, 401 U.S. 950 (1971).
' Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977).
"Id
19791
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:565
legal advice and preventing abuse of the attorney-client privilege."
Diversified appears more reasonable since it does not require a deter-
mination of the relevancy of communications funneled through cor-
porate counsel. Diversified's approach puts the responsibility on
employee-agents to maintain a limited distribution pattern for any
material subject to the attorney-client privilege. Since dissemination
will only be to people who have a need to know, 7 Diversified represents
a logical and fair use of the attorney-client privilege.
When the Supreme Court defines the "client" in the Upjohn corporate
setting, it will not be resolving the only difficulty apparent in applying
the attorney-client privilege to a corporate entity. There are a number
of limitations relating to the corporate use of the privilege that should
be examined.
B. Communications With an "Attorney"
In order for the attorney-client privilege to apply to shield discovery
of a client's communications, there must be an attempt to secure legal
advice.U Limitations arise in the application of the attorney-client
privilege to protect communications to "special counsel" or to a non-
attorney employee of the lawyer.
The Diversified litigation involved the disclosure of memoranda that
had been prepared respecting bribes allegedly made to purchasing
agents of other business entities, including the Weatherhead Company.
Special counsel had been retained to conduct an investigation of Diver-
sified's business after disclosure in an SEC consent decree revealed a
"slush fund" for the payment of bribes. Two separate letters prepared
by counsel, along with other documents, were sought by the plaintiff,
Weatherhead, in this separate civil action.
The federal appellate court initially held that the special counsel "was
employed solely for the purpose of making an investigation of facts and
to make business recommendations. The work that [the] Law Firm was
employed to perform could have been performed just as readily by non-
lawyers... ." The court held that two memoranda prepared for Diver-
sified by special counsel were not entitled to privilege protection because
the law firm was not retained to provide legal services or advice.0 Diver-
United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 282 (6th Cir. 1964).
" Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 609.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, at 554.
Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 603.
Id at 603-04. Diversified's first opinion seems to view a corporation's at-
torney in the limited degree of a representative in an adversary relationship.
This is the view expressed by Dean McCormick:
Our adversary system of litigation casts the lawyer in the role of a
fighter for the party whom he-represents. A strong sentiment of loyalty
attaches to the relationship, and this sentiment would be outraged by an
attempt to change our customs so as to make the lawyer amenable to
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol28/iss4/4
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sified's communications were protected in a subsequent en banc hearing
which held the "modified Harper & Row" test protected communica-
tions between the law firm and the employees of Diversified as well as
the product thereof."1 The en banc court disagreed with the prior deter-
mination that the special counsel were not providing the requisite legal
advice to invoke the attorney-client privilege:
The charge to the professional legal adviser was a broad one.
The law firm was given complete autonomy to conduct a profes-
sional investigation and inquiry. It was authorized to procure
such assistance including accounting services as reasonably re-
quired. It was authorized to interview any employee of the cor-
poration who might have knowledge of the facts-from the
President to the nonmanagerial employees. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, it was given the authority to analyze the accounting data,
to evaluate and draw conclusions as to the propriety of past ac-
tions and to make recommendations for possible future courses
of action .... To be sure, there are possibilities of abuse, but the
application of the attorney-client privilege to this matter and
others like it will encourage corporations to seek out and correct
wrong-doing [sic] in their own house and to do so with attorneys
who are obligated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to
conduct the inquiry in an independent and ethical manner. 2
The protection afforded to communications with outside counsel by
the federal courts has not always been so broad as that reflected in the
Diversified opinion, nor should it be. In SEC v. Canadian Javelin, Ltd. 8
the attorney-client privilege was claimed when the SEC attempted to
discover documents containing the conclusions of an attorney retained
as special, independent counsel designated by the company to perform
an investigation pursuant to an injunction and consent decree. The
general purpose of the decree was to prevent false statements about
Javelin's finances. The specific duty of the independent counsel was to
monitor and report on compliance with the injunction. 4 The decree
routine examination upon the client's confidential disclosure regarding
professional business. Loyalty and sentiment are silken threads, but
they are hard to break.
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 87 at 176 (2d ed. 1972).
" Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 610-11.
," Id. at 610. While Diversified's claim of privilege was thus upheld, the vic-
tory was indeed a hollow one. It has been pointed out that although "the
privilege was stoutly contested in the trial court, on appeal, and in en banc
rehearing, the same report which the court found to be privileged was sub-
poenaed by the SEC and ultimately obtained by the plaintiff from the SEC, while
the rehearing was pending." Kidston, Privileged Communications, 34 Bus. LAW.
853, 859 (1979).
" 451 F. Supp. 594 (D.D.C. 1978).
" Id at 596.
1979)
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specifically indicated that Javelin could "have no business or profes-
sional relationship ... other than the performance of the functions" with
the outside counsel.45 The Javelin court found the attorney-client
privilege to be nonexistent because the attorney owed no duty to
Javelin.46
The difference between the results in Javelin and Diversified
represents the difference in the scope of duties undertaken by the "at-
torney" in the cases. The attorney in Javelin owed no obligation to the
corporation47 since he had been hired to perform investigative services
rather than render legal advice to a client. The attorneys in Diversified,
on the other hand, were engaged by the client for the purpose of pro-
viding the type of legal service and advice traditionally rendered by
lawyers." Thus, in order for the attorney-client privilege to apply to
communications with outside counsel, the parties must be in a relation-
ship in which the attorney is obligated to provide legal advice to the
client and is expected to be loyal to the client's interests. 9
The attorney-client privilege may apply to communications made to a
non-attorney if disclosures to the attorney's agent are made for the pur-
pose of securing legal advice." This extension of the privilege is not
automatic but becomes applicable when the attorney uses another per-
son in a consultative role before the legal advice is given.51 There are
limitations on the extension based on the timing and quality of the ad-
vice given.
In United States v. Kove15 a former Internal Revenue Service agent
(not an attorney) employed by a tax law firm refused to respond to a
grand jury question on the basis that he "was an employee under the
direct supervision of the partners" of a law firm. 53 The federal appellate
court held that the attorney-client privilege extended to situations in
which an accountant performed services for the attorney prior to the
rendering of legal advice:
We cannot regard the privilege as confined to "menial or
ministerial" employees. Thus, we can see no significant dif-
ference between a case where the attorney sends a client speak-
ing a foreign language to an interpreter to make a literal
translation of the client's story; a second where the attorney,
45 Id
47 Id.
8 Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 600.
" United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d at 1226.
United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
Id. at 347.
296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
Id. at 919.
[Vol. 28:565
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himself having some little knowledge of the foreign tongue, has
a more knowledgeable non-lawyer employee in the room to help
out; a third where someone to perform that same function has
been brought along by the client; and a fourth where the at-
torney, ignorant of the foreign language, sends the client to a
non-lawyer proficient in it, with instructions to interview the
client on the attorney's behalf and then render his own sum-
mary of the situation, perhaps drawing on his knowledge in the
process, so that the attorney can give the client proper legal ad-
vice.
Accounting concepts are a foreign language to some lawyers
in almost all cases, and to almost all lawyers in some cases.
Hence, the presence of an accountant, whether hired by the
lawyer or by the client, while the client is relating a complicated
tax story to the lawyer, would not destroy the privilege, any
more than that of the linguist in the second or third variations of
the foreign language theme discussed above .... What is vital
to the privilege is that the communication be made in confidence
for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from the lawyer.'
Kovel thereby extended the attorney-client privilege to accountants
providing services to an attorney before legal advice is rendered. The
timing of the accountant's consultation appears critical. In United
States v. Cote" an accountant for husband and wife taxpayers was
specifically retained by their lawyer to conduct an audit of the tax-
payers' books and records. The lawyer maintained custody over the
books and records while the accountant examined them in the
attorney's office. Subsequent to the audit the lawyer advised his clients
to file amended returns for three separate years, reflecting more income
for each year. The IRS subsequently summoned the accountant, who
refused to turn over his workpapers by "claiming they were in the
possession and control of the attorney."" The attorney asserted the
attorney-client privilege when summoned to bring the documents. In fin-
ding that the accountant's audit was conducted for the benefit of the at-
torney prior to his giving advice to his clients "and was an integral part
of . . . [the advice rendered]," the court supported the privilege. 7
Ironically, by filing the tax returns, the taxpayers were deemed to have
waived the privilege since a substantial portion of the returns reflected
Id. at 921-22 (emphasis in original).
456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 144.
5' Id. The court's decision turned on the fact that the attorney had not ad-
vised the taxpayers to file amended returns before reviewing the accountant's
workpapers. "[Ilf the advice to file the returns was first given by Murphy [the at-
torney] and thereafter the accountant was employed simply to make the correct
mechanical calculations, the privilege would not apply." Id.
19791
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"at least in part, the substance of... [the] information [communicated to
the attorney].""
In situations where the timing of the accountant's consultation will
prohibit invocation of the attorney-client privilege because the account-
ant's services are rendered after the legal advice, the client may still be
able to prevent disclosure by asserting a fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. In In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon
J. K. Lasser & Co.59 the taxpayers, subjects of a grand jury investiga-
tion, moved to quash a subpoena duces tecum served on an accountant
hired by their attorney to prepare their tax return. It was established
that the taxpayers had consulted the attorney for advice with respect to
both the investigation of their previous year's return and preparation of
a return for the current year. Prior to seeking the assistance of the ac-
countant, the attorney determined his course of action with respect to
his clients' return. He then utilized the accountant's services to com-
plete the return. The taxpayers argued that the fifth amendment
privilege had been preserved through the intervention of the attorney-
client privilege while the government asserted that no attorney-client
privilege arose since the lawyer rendered his advice before consulting
the accountant."
Rather than summarily dismissing the taxpayer's claim on the basis
of the timing of the advice, as Kovel would seem to dictate, the court.
engaged in a lengthy examination of the accountant's role in "the effec-
tive implementation of the attorney-client plan to pay the tax without
disclosing information that might incriminate the taxpayers.""1 The
court concluded:
[There was] no showing here that the least complexity attended
the simple matter of adding the figures and computing the tax
from the table furnished in the instruction pamphlet accompany-
ing the return forms. No difficult question or complex account-
ing concept was referred to during the oral argument; it ap-
peared only that the reference to the accountant was made as a
matter of convenience and possible economy. In principle it can-
not, in effect, be held that it is necessary or particularly ap-
Id at 145. In determining that the disclosure of the end results of the ac-
countant's work waived the privilege as to the underlying workpapers, which in-
cluded some data not revealed in the amended tax returns, the court relied upon
the authority of United States v. Tellier, 255 F.2d 441, 448 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 821 (1958): "ITihe privilege attaches to the substance of a communication
and not to the particular words used to express the communication's content."
456 F.2d at 145.
s 448 F. Supp. 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
Id. at 108.
Id.
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propriate to invoke the services of an accountant to file an ap-
parently simple tax return.62
Since the court based its determination on the simplicity of the tax
return, the decision implies that if the attorney first decides upon a
course of action and subsequently enlists the aid of an accountant to per-
form complicated accounting services, communications between the at-
torney and the accountant, and the accountant's workpapers, may well
be privileged.
Thus, except for the possible application of the fifth amendment
privilege, Kovel would not extend the attorney-client privilege to com-
munications with the accountant or his workpapers unless the activity
took place after counsel is retained and before the rendering of legal ad-
vice.63 The accountant would also have to be an agent of the attorney in
order for the privilege to apply."'
62 Id at 108-09.
One interesting problem which apparently has yet to be raised in any of the
Kovel-type extensions of the attorney-client privilege concerns the encroachment
of such an extension on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4) dealing with ex-
pert witnesses. Rule 26(b)(4) states, inter alia:
(4) Trial Preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions
held by experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivi-
sion (b)(1) of this rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of litiga-
tion or for trial, may be obtained only as follows:
(A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to
identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert
witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert witness
is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opin-
ions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the
grounds for each opinion. (ii) Upon motion, the court may order further
discovery by other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope, and
such provisions, pursuant to subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule, concerning
fees and expenses as the court may deem appropriate.
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert
who has been retained or specially employed by another party in an-
ticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is expected to be
called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) [ie., physicians'
reports] or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it
is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opin-
ions on the same subject by other means.
There would not be a correlative problem in federal criminal cases because
the provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b)(2) exempt from
disclosure documents or statements made by the attorney or his agent in connec-
tion with the investigation or defense of the case.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, recently ruled that client
fraud destroys the work-product doctrine except as it applies to the'thought pro-
cesses of an attorney. In re: Special September 1978 Grand Jury (/H), No. 79-1218
(April, 1980).
" United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
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C. Communication With the "Right" Lawyer
The attorney-client privilege will not apply if the corporation has
waived the privilege or if the realities of the situation indicate that the
lawyer was not acting as a legal adviser but merely as a member of the
business team. In either case, an individual officer, director or
employee, who may have made communications in reliance on the
privilege, will be stripped of its protection.
An individual cannot claim an attorney-client privilege as an officer of
a corporation which has waived the privilege unless the attorney also
represented the officer in an individual capacity.65 The individual
representation must be proven by evidence showing a personal
representation at the time of the communications subject to the
attorney-client privilege. For example, in United States v. Bartlett," an
attorney, Parker, attended two of the company's director meetings at
which he was accused by Bartlett, the company president, of attempting
to take over the company. Litigation followed in which Bartlett was
charged with numerous violations of the securities, mail fraud and wire
fraud statutes. In response to Bartlett's claim that the attorney-client
privilege attached to information communicated between Bartlett and
Parker at these meetings, it was held that no attorney-client relation-
ship had existed at the time of the disclosure. In the court's view, at the
time the alleged confidential communications were made the relation-
ship established was between the attorney and the corporation. "The
fact that Parker may have subsequently represented Bartlett at some
SEC hearings does not establish that Parker was serving as Bartlett's
attorney at the time here critical. The fact that Bartlett accused . . .
Parker of conspiracy to take over the company . . . goes far to negate
any attorney-client relationship then existing." 7
Because of limitations on the individual application of the attorney-
client privilege, counsel for a corporation has the burden of advising a
corporate officer or employee of the problems associated with confiden-
tial communications when the lawyer is representing only the corpora-
tion."8 Since counsel may represent both the corporation and the officer,
. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 1029, 1033-34
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
449 F.2d 700 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 932 (1971).
87 Id. at 704.
When the corporation waives the privilege respecting communications
made to counsel by a corporate officer or employee, such person stands alone and
without any protection notwithstanding the fact that he may be a member of the
control group. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Detroit, Michigan, 434 F. Supp.
648 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1977). "[fIn the absence of any indica-
tion to the company's lawyer that the lawyer is to act in any other capacity than
as lawyer for the company in giving and receiving communications from control
group personnel, the privilege is and should remain that of the company and not
that of the communicating officer." Id. at 650.
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extensive plans should be made at the earliest stage of any investiga-
tion or inquiry for dual representation. In this manner, corporate of-
ficers, directors and employees will be able to make a complete disclo-
sure to counsel without loss of the privileged status of the communica-
tion through corporate waiver."'
The status of an individual attorney within the corporate enterprise
can be as critical as that of an employee asserting the attorney-client
privilege. When the attorney acting as counsel for the corporate client
has acquired a substantial ownership or managerial interest in the cor-
poration, communications between the attorney and other members of
the corporation are divested of the attorney-client privilege.7 0 Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. v. Fielding" indicated that the objec-
tives of the attorney-client privilege would be thwarted if the privilege
was extended to communications between members of the ownership or
management team:
The relationship [between attorney and client] must be one
which supports the reason for the ethical and evidentiary sanc-
tions, that is, the public policy promoting full disclosure in the
interests of obtaining sound and well-considered legal advice.
When the attorney and the client get in bed together as
business partners, their relationship is a business relationship,
not a professional one, and their confidences are business con-
fidences unprotected by a professional privilege."
Because of the importance of free disclosure in securing legal advice,
it is important for a corporation to offer adequate protection to
employees if the corporation waives the attorney-client privilege. Equally
essential is a structuring of situations where the attorney-client
" In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
70 Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. v. Fielding, 343 F. Supp. 537 (D.
Nev. 1972). The Fielding case was a complicated piece of litigation in which the
plaintiffs were ex-officers and directors of two corporations who also served as
counsel to the corporations and the other directors. The defendants were ex-
officers, directors and employees of the corporations, many of whom had availed
themselves of the plaintiffs' legal services both in a corporate and an individual
capacity. Suit was filed over alleged securities violations, and the defendants at-
tempted to foil the lawsuit by asserting the attorney-client privilege as between
plaintiffs and defendants. The court held that no privilege existed and that the
plaintiffs' fiduciary duties as members of the corporations' "control groups" were
far more deserving of recognition than the attorney-client privilege. Certainly
this rule would also apply to an attorney who becomes a majority shareholder
and, arguably, to corporate counsel who acquires any "substantial" financial in-
terest in a corporate client.
71 Id.
" Id at 546.
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privilege may be asserted in a manner so that little doubt will arise as
to the relevance of communications in procurring legal advice.
D. Waiver Through Disclosure of Privileged Information
In United States v. Upjohn73 the court held that an IRS summons to
the chief legal officer of a company was enforceable with respect to files,
documents, and communications made to counsel during the course of an
internal investigation of the company. The results of the investigation
had been made known to the SEC on a Form 8-K report. The court
found that even if the communications had been privileged when made,
the company's disclosure to the SEC dealt a fatal blow to a subsequent
assertion of the privilege:
In the present case, the Company made disclosures to the SEC
with respect to the questionable payments in its 8-K report ....
Furthermore, the Company agreed to furnish the SEC with any
additional data it might request with respect to such payments ...
copies of the SEC reports and related data was [sic] also furnished
to the IRS. Having disclosed some data with respect to ques-
tionable payments, it now seeks to hold back other data relating
to the same matter. Under the circumstances, the company
should be deemed to have waived the attorney-client privilege
with respect to the same matter, if indeed it ever existed.7 '
The Upjohn court's ruling is a proper application of the general rule
concerning waivers of the privilege through disclosure. A succinct for-
mulation of this rule is that "[olnce ... [a] party begins to disclose any
confidential communication for a purpose outside the scope of the
privilege, the privilege is lost for all communications relating to the
same matter."75
13 78-1 U.S.T.C. 9277, 41 A.F.T.R.2d 78-796 (W.D. Mich. 1978), affd in part,
rev'd in par 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1310 (1980)
(No. 79-886).
7, Id. at 83,603, 41 A.F.T.R.2d at 78-803.
Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 46 (D. Md. 1974). A question
thus arises as to when a disclosure is made "for a purpose within the scope of the
privilege." In the corporate context there appears to be only three types of actual
disclosure that will not effect a limited waiver of the privilege: (1) An inadvertent
disclosure of the privileged material. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508,
519 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976) ("[plrivilege not
waived by inadvertent failure to excise from another document in discovery pro-
cedure sentence allegedly disclosing the substance of legal advice." Id.), (2) A
disclosure of a privileged communication from one executive of the corporate
client to another. ("A discussion between executives of legal advice should be
privileged." Id. at 518). Arguably, this is no disclosure at all since executives are
generally identified as the corporate client. Cf. Herbert v. Londo, 73 F.R.D. 387,
400 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (purposeful receipt by "non-control group" employee of copy
of lawyer's memorandum containing legal advice and addressed to "control
group" members did not waive the privilege) and (3) Although still virgin territory,
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The majority rule is that any disclosures before the SEC will effect a
permanent waiver of the material disclosed."6 This rule applies even
when the disclosure is voluntary." During the SEC investigation of
Penn Central, the agency deposed counsel for a group of prospective
underwriters of Penn Central commercial paper. The lawyer-witnesses
contacted their underwriter-clients and advised them that "it might be
in [the clients'] best interest to waive the attorney-client privilege con-
cerning the discussions at a meeting" held in counsel's office." The at-
torney then testified before the SEC and produced a memorandum
prepared by counsel.
As a consequence of both the delivery of a memorandum by one of the
lawyer-witnesses at the time that the underwriting was still in the plan-
ning stage and the lawyer's testimony before the SEC, the court found
that the attorney-client privilege had been waived. Thus, in subsequent
litigation against another client of the lawyer's firm the memorandum
referred to above and certain other documents were subject to
discovery-the privileged nature thereof notwithstanding- simply
because they had been voluntarily produced to the SEC in another pro-
ceeding."9
it appears that the privilege may be retained if the attorney or client discloses a
privileged communication to counsel for a third person who has a "community of
interest" with the client. In Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D.
Md. 1974), the plaintiff asserted such a privilege; the court cited with approval
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503(b) which recognizes such a privilege, but
then analyzed the problem in terms of the work-product doctrine. Id at 43-44.
Examples of limited disclosure that do effect a limited waiver of the privilege
abound. For example, disclosure of privileged information by the attorney to op-
posing counsel during negotiations aimed at settling a lawsuit effects a waiver of
the information disclosed. See, e.g., I.B.M. v. Sperry-Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10 (D.
Del. 1968).
76 See, e.g., SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 453 F. Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1978). Cf
Herbert v. Londo, 73 F.R.D. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (disclosure to the SEC is not a
waiver).
77 In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litigation, 61 F.R.D. 453 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
71 Id. at 458.
" A similar situation occurred in the field of patent law. Since an applicant
must disclose to the patent office "information concerning a description of the
product, the processes used, and public use and sale for more than one year," no
attorney-client privilege may be claimed. Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65
F.R.D. 26, 39 (D. Md. 1974). This differs from an SEC proceeding, however, in that
such disclosures must be made before the applicant may receive a patent,
whereas not every attorney assisting in a securities transaction expects to find
himself testifying before the SEC. Hence, in patent applications no privilege may
attach, while in the securities area a valid privilege is deemed waived. Further-
more, in this day and age, once an SEC investigation is concluded, it would ap-
pear that absent good cause shown, most information furnished to the SEC can
be reached by a Freedom of Information Act request.
19791
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:565
Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith" further opened the door to
future litigation in the SEC disclosure area by applying a waiver more
restrictive than the general rule. In the original hearing the court deter-
mined that the privilege never attached to the communications at issue.
The court was "reluctant to hold that the voluntary surrender of
privileged material to a governmental agency in obedience to an agency
subpoena constitutes a waiver of the privilege for all purposes."8 Judge
Heaney, in a separate opinion concluded that no waiver occurred
because "[a) waiver of the privilege must occur in the same proceeding
in which it is sought to be invoked."8
Upon the subsequent en banc hearing, the court's decision was set
aside, resulting in a finding that the attorney-client privilege did attach
in litigation following compliance with a government subpoena. As to
the waiver issue the court said:
We finally address the issue of whether Diversified waived its
attorney-client privilege with respect to the privileged material
by voluntarily surrendering it to the SEC pursuant to an agency
subpoena. As Diversified disclosed these documents in a sep-
arate and nonpublic SEC investigation, we conclude that only a
limited waiver of the privilege occurred. To hold otherwise may
have the effect of thwarting the developing procedure of cor-
porations to employ independent outside counsel to investigate
and advise them in order to protect stockholders, potential
stockholders and customers. 3
While nothing in this language would indicate that the court
established a more restricted waiver than that found in Penn Central,
other factors combine to dictate such a conclusion. The majority en banc
opinion was written by Judge Heaney, who had authored an opinion con-
curring in part and dissenting in part in the lower court. His opinion,
after declaring the existence of a "limited waiver," cites Bucks County
Bank and Trust Co. v. Storck," which held that a party who waived the
privilege to testify on a motion for the return of property illegally seized
by law enforcement officers could later revive the privilege to squelch
testimony in a subsequent civil case. In addition, Judge Heaney stated,
"I agree with the majority of the court ... that the privileges claimed
by Diversified, if originally extant, were not waived by the voluntary
572 F.2d 596, 603 (8th Cir. 1977).
8' Id. at 604 n.1.
Id. at 604 (Heaney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d 256, 259 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 (1961)).
572 F.2d at 611 (citations omitted).
297 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Haw. 1969).
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol28/iss4/4
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
disclosures made by Diversified to the Securities & Exchange Commis-
sion ... ""
In addition to SEC disclosure, there are a number of other areas
in which the attorney-client privilege is considered to be waived
through disclosure to a party extant to the attorney-client relationship.
In Garfinkle v. Arcata National Corp.8" the court held that documents
developed by counsel for the defendants in connection with the ultimate
issuance of an acquisition opinion letter to the plaintiffs were subject to
discovery and not protected by the attorney-client privilege. According
to Garfinkle, disclosures will be considered to waive the privilege in ac-
quisition transactions where the opinion of counsel is directed to a non-
client party to the transaction.87
Another type of opinion letter, that issued by counsel to accountants
for use in connection with the preparation of financial reports, is likely
to develop into a fertile source of privilege litigation. One authority
despairingly reports, "I express no opinion as to what the law is when
applied to the house counsel's and outside counsel's letters requested by
auditors for financial reports and related matters. This is likely to be a
growing problem for all of us."88
In our judgment an attorney's response to an auditor's inquiry may be
exposed to discovery by the court. There are three counts upon which
these letters will fail to qualify as privileged communications. First, ac-
countants are arguably not identifiable as the "client." While it is
generally true that communications between the agent of the client and
the attorney are privileged, 9 it is difficult to characterize an independ-
ent auditor as an agent of the client. Secondly, the information re-
quested is not "legal advice." Typically, the client does not intend to
' Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 611-12 (Heaney, J., concurr-
ing in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). See also, Permian Corp. v.
United States, 556 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-i, (June 4, 1980), which held that
confidential, "privileged" documents inadvertently and unintentionally given to a
target company during the process of expedited discovery retained their privi-
leged status and were not subsequently discoverable by the Department of
Energy in a different proceeding.
64 F.R.D. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
8714
"
Kidston, Privileged Communications, 34 Bus. LAW. 853, 855 (1979).
8, In United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961), the court said, in dic-
tum:
We do not deal in this opinion with the question under what cir-
cumstances, if any, such communications could be deemed privileged on
the basis that they were being made to the accountant as the client's
agent for the purpose of subsequent communication by the accountant to
the lawyer; communications by the client's agent to the attorney are
privileged ....
Id at 922 n.4.
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take any action in recognition of the letter's contents and the auditor
desires the information merely to calculate its affect on the
corporation's financial statement. This brings us to the third reason
these responses will fail to qualify for privilege protection. Attorneys'
responses are requested to assist the auditor in assessing the material-
ity of such information for the benefit of readers of the financial
statements. If the attorney's response reveals a significant potential
liability the client's financial statements may require a provision for the
contingent liability. If the attorney's response gives the client a clean
bill of health or discusses liabilities deemed too remote to deserve com-
ment in the financial statements, these facts will be indirectly disclosed
by an unqualified opinion.9° Clearly, confidentiality should not be con-
templated with respect to these responses.
" A similar problem arises when in-house counsel and the company's financial
managers must make such representations to auditors about the state of the com-
pany. The following, taken from a recent article, is excerpted at length due to the
importance of the message it conveys:
A key aspect of the relationship between the financial and legal
departments revolves about the relationship with the outside auditors.
The legal department can play a positive role in helping the financial
management of the company to adequately disclose to the auditors the
company's warts, both present and future. The auditors' search letter
plays an important, although circular, role in that process. So does the
management representation letter.
SAS-19 provides for a standard form of management representation
letter. As written, that form is inadequate. Thus, the standard represen-
tation letter requires the chief executive and financial officers to repre-
sent that there are "no possible violation of laws or regulations whose
effect should be considered for disclosure." The key words are "possible"
and "should be considered." All kinds of possible violations are routinely
considered by management: must they all be discussed in writing to the
auditors? An explanatory comment that the representation is limited to
matters which require accrual or disclosure in the company's financial
statement should be added to the management representation letter.
The legal department should thus ensure that the management
representation letter is properly limited, and that it is accurately
drafted to disclose fully all material liabilities and contingencies.
The auditors' search letter and the lawyer's response are key cogs in
the legal-financial balance wheel. The ABA-approved format appears to
be working reasonably well; however, a problem in the lawyer-
accountant accommodation often arises after the auditor receives the
lawyer's response to the search letter. The typical scenario involves a
call to the General Counsel from the audit partner requesting a meeting.
After the usual amenities, the audit partner will thank General Counsel
for this letter; will express appreciation for the approved format that
was worked by the lawyers and the auditors; and then will ask the
General Counsel to let him know "what's really going on." Essentially
the audit partner hopes to engage in a discussion covering any material
exposures, litigation, threatened litigation or other contingencies. After
such a discussion, the audit partner will typically dictate a memorandum
to his files. That memorandum is not privileged. It is never seen by the
General Counsel unless the company is subsequently sued. It is likely to
[Vol. 28:565
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Another area which raises the disclosure question relates
to the exchange of papers between the attorney and client in the procur-
ing of legal advice. In SEC v. Texas International Airlines, Inc.9" the
court considered whether the privilege covered "trust agreements,
disclosure statements, and press releases ... which were intended to be
made public in their final form, but prior to such publication were to be
screened by respondent's attorneys."92 The court felt that a critical ele-
ment of the inquiry was the role the client intended the attorney to
play. If the attorney's role was "minor or perfunctory or ... intended
merely to immunize the documents from production,""3 the SEC's argu-
ment that the required secrecy was lacking would be correct and the
privilege would be unavailable. If, however, the client intended that the
attorney play a major consultative role in determining the final contents
of the documents, then the mere fact that the final product was to be
made public would not strip the documents of the privilege. "[W]hen a
client sends a draft to an attorney for review, his intention is to make
public only such information as appears appropriate for publication in
the context of and according to the lawyer's advice."9 '
III. THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE IN CIVIL CASES
If the attorney-client privilege cannot be invoked to protect com-
munications between counsel and the corporate client, the work-product
exception of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) may be utilized to
exclude certain communications from discovery:
26(b)(3) Trial Preparations: Materials. Subject to the provisions
of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of
documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under
subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that
other party's representative (including his attorney, consultant,
have sweeping language to the effect that the General Counsel assured
the audit partner that everything is fine, and that there are no
possibilities for contingencies whatever.
That discussion should not be held ....
Kennedy, Professional Responsibility and the Inside Lawyer, 34 Bus. LAW. 867,
872-73 (1979).
9, No. 79-0126 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 1979).
Id., slip op. at 4.
3 Id.
", Id. The court based its holding on United States v. Schlegel, 313 F. Supp.
177 (D. Neb. 1970), a tax fraud case. In Schlegel, the taxpayer delivered several
summaries and schedules to his accountant for use in filling out the taxpayer's
return. Upon receiving the completed return, the taxpayer returned it to the at-
torney with new schedules and summaries designed to produce a lesser tax
liability. The taxpayer later attempted to have testimony by the attorney as to
this transaction barred by the attorney-client privilege. The court held that the
taxpayer's summaries were privileged.
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surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that
the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the
materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of
the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such
materials when the required showing has been made, the court
shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, con-
clusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation."
The federal rule specifically requires that the information be
prepared "in anticipation of litigation or for trial. 96 "Advising a client
about matters which may or even [more] likely will ultimately come to
litigation does not satisfy the 'in anticipation of litigation' standard." 7
According to the majority of courts, a specific claim must have arisen
that makes the prospect of litigation identifiable in order for the excep-
tion to be applicable. 98
In the Diversified litigation the work-product doctrine was not
recognized to prevent discovery of documents prepared a very short
time before the lawsuit was filed because litigation had not commenced
at the time of document preparation.99 Diversified's board of directors
had authorized special counsel to investigate and report on the com-
pany's business practices in light of some information which had surfac-
ed during prior litigation. The law firm's association with the client com-
menced in June, 1975 and the lawsuit was filed by the plaintiff one
month later. The court determined that a memorandum from the law
firm to Diversified dated June 19, 1975 was not entitled to work-product
protection because it "was not prepared in anticipation of litigation or
for trial.'"0
In contrast to the narrow construction of the work-product exception
followed in Diversified, the "litigation" requirement of the work-product
doctrine has received a much broader interpretation in the context of
patent law. In Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp.,' a patent infringement ac-
tion, the court held that "[i]f the primary concern of the attorney is with
claims which would potentially arise in future litigation, the work pro-
90 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
9Id.
97 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 412 F. Supp. 943, 948 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 515 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed,
534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976).
" Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
' Id It has also been ruled that documents prepared in anticipation of a
tender offer which did not reach fruition are not protected from the work product
doctrine, even though a tender offer has "obvious litigation potential." Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 725 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
,0 434 F. Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1977).
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duct immunity applies; if the . . . concern is claims which have arisen or
will arise during the ex parte prosecution of the application, however,
the work product rule does not apply."'0 2 The Hercules distinction was
based on the nature of a patent application proceeding which lacks the
"give and take" of an adversary proceeding."'
Another patent infringement action, Burlington Indus. v. Exxon
Corp. ," held the work-product doctrine applicable to documents contain-
ing technical and legal analysis. In considering the applicability of the
doctrine, the court stated "[in order to satisfy the requirement that
documents be prepared in anticipation of litigation, it is not necessary
that the documents be prepared after litigation has been commenced.
The work product doctrine applies to material prepared when litigation
is merely a contingency.'0 5
The broad approach to the work-product doctrine applied in Hercules
and Burlington seems more consonant with the objectives of Federal
Rule 26(b)(3) than the narrow approach followed in Diversified. The
work-product doctrine applies in order to protect from discovery the
fruits of an attorney's labor. If the work-product exception were not
available, attorneys would often be disinclined to engage in the pretrial
analysis necessary to protect a client's interests.' In most cases where
special counsel or outside counsel are conducting an investigation, it is
reasonable to assume that the investigation might lead to the discovery
of unlawful acts. Litigation would, therefore, be a contingency as in the
Burlington case and the work-product doctrine should apply.' 7 Under
the narrow approach to the work-product doctrine employed in Diver-
sified, however, there would not be a safe harbor for communications
and impressions during the course of a special investigation because
litigation will not have commenced at the time of preparation and
analysis of the documents.'
102 Id. at 152.
"'i Id. The Hercules decision is in conflict with an earlier decision of the same
court, In re Natta, 48 F.R.D. 319 (D. Del. 1969) which held that documentary
material relating both to ex parte applications for a patent, as well as patent in-
terference proceedings, was subject to a claim of privilege. Id. at 321.
114 65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md. 1974).
11 Id. at 42 (emphasis added). The attorney-client privilege was also held ap-
plicable.
106 "This work product immunity is the embodiment of a policy that a lawyer
doing a lawyer's work in preparation of a case for trial should not be hampered
by the knowledge that he might be called upon at any time to hand over the
results of his work to an opponent." Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage at Retorderre de
Chavanoz, 487 F.2d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 1973).
" The work-product doctrine is as equally applicable in grand jury pro-
ceedings as in civil litigation. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 509
(2d Cir. 1979) and authorities cited therein.
"' Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977); SCM v.
Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir.
1976).
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Courts will often recognize the work-product exception to exclude
from discovery materials prepared during a prior litigation if the
materials are sought in a subsequent and related cause of action. In
Republic Gear Company v. Borg-Warner Corp.'9 the court held that
documents protected under either the work-product doctrine or the
attorney-client privilege were subject to continuing protection in a
lawsuit related to the first litigation."' In both lawsuits the allegation
made was that Borg-Warner had tortiously interfered with contractual
relations established between Republic Gear and two Brazilian com-
panies. The first suit had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and was
on appeal when the decision regarding the application of the work-
product doctrine was rendered. In finding the documents exempt from
discovery, the Republic Gear court distinguished other cases which had
allowed discovery of previously protected documents on the basis that
they "dealt with material prepared for use in prior proceedings which
had been fully completed before discovery [in the second litigation] was
requested.""'
Other courts have rejected the "related case" doctrine. For example,
in United States v. I.B.M."'1 the court held "that for something to be con-
sidered 'trial preparation material' (work-product) . . . it must be
prepared 'in anticipation of litigation or for trial' in the case in which
the special immunity accorded to such material is sought.""' The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois also rejected
the doctrine in Panter v. Marshall Field Co."" but held the documents
privileged because they were prepared in anticipation of a litigation.
Panter involved alleged violations of Section 14(e) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 19341" and breaches of fiduciary duties. In respect to the
plaintiff's contention that the work-product doctrine extends only to
documents prepared for the current litigation, the court responded that
"[although] there is authority for limiting the availability of work-
product protection to cases involving facts and issues related to the in-
stant litigation, the weight of modern authority supports the conclusion
that the work-product privilege extends to documents prepared in an-
ticipation of prior, terminated litigation, regardless of the intercon-
nectedness of the issues or facts.""'
10 381 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1967).
110 Id.
" Id. at 557 (citing Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 207 F.
Supp. 407, 410 (M.D. Pa. 1962) and Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica
Corp., 16 F.R.D. 534, 537 (D. Del. 1954)).
"' 66 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
"' Id. at 178.
" 80 F.R.D. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
15 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
"I Panter v. Marshall Field Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 724 (N.D. Il. 1978) (citing In re
Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 333-35 (8th Cir. 1977) and cases cited therein). 24https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol28/iss4/4
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In United States v. Upjohn Co." 7 the district court did not accept the
defendant's claim that corporate counsel's notes of interviews with
employees constituted material within the work-product exception. The
court held the material subject to discovery because of a showing of
substantial need on the plaintiff's part and an inability "without undue
hardship" to obtain the material by other means.1 ' Because the court
determined that the doctrine was not a privilege but an exception to the
discovery rules which applied when there were alternative methods
available to obtain the necessary material,' 9 the Upjohn decision was
restricted to the application of the substantial needs test. Upjohn,
therefore, neither dealt with the limits of the "anticipation of litigation"
requirement as Diversified had'" nor the related case doctrine rejected
in LB.M.' Even after Upjohn is decided by the Supreme Court, the
work-product doctrine will undoubtedly continue to protect from
discovery certain documents prepared in anticipation of litigation.
The boundaries of the excluded category of work-product materials
have been inconsistently defined by the lower federal courts.' Perhaps
the Supreme Court's decision in the Upjohn circumstances will go
beyond the "substantial need" exception to the application of the doc-
trine to define the class of materials the doctrine is designed to
protect.' 3
IV. CONCLUSION
The need for the attorney-client privilege in the corporate setting is
indisputable. In order to secure adequate legal advice, a corporation re-
quires an atmosphere in which the employees knowledgeable of the
facts relating to its legal problems will have the opportunity to discuss
these facts with legal counsel.
Until, and unless, the Supreme Court provides some guidance in Up-
john one must be aware of the application of the attorney-client
privilege to virtually all communications between a corporate agent and
', 78-1 U.S.T.C. 9277, 41 A.F.T.R.2d 78-796 (W.D. Mich. 1978), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1310 (1980)
(No. 79-886).
"I Id. at 83,604, 41 A.F.T.R.2d 78-804.
119 Id.
,, Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
121 United States v. I.B.M., 66 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Compare Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977)
(communication protected when made for purpose of securing legal advice) to
Panter v. Marshall Field Co., 80 F.R.D. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (more than remote
possibility of litigation necessary).
1" Waiver of the work-product doctrine can only be accomplished by the at-
torney and not by his client. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 725
n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (citing Handgards v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929
(N.D. Cal. 1976)).
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its attorney. Because of the potential application of the privilege the
corporation should structure its communications with counsel in a man-
ner which will permit the privilege to attach even under a narrow con-
struction. Probably the safest test for determining the extent of the
group encompassing the corporate "client" is the "modified Harper &
Row" test employed in Diversified Indus. v. Meredith. Implementation
of this test would restrict the class for which the privilege could be
asserted or within which disclosure would not waive the privilege to
those who "have a need to know" the legal advice procured subsequent
to the disclosure. 1
24
As far as activity that may possibly waive attorney-client privilege, it
appears that future litigation will establish new boundaries to replace
the general rule that any disclosure waives the privilege."5 Until more
guidance is provided by court decisions, lawyers and their corporate
clients must recognize that the attorney-client privilege is designed to
protect only communications made for the purpose of securing legal ad-
vice and not other services that an attorney may be called upon to per-
form.
The work-product doctrine may continue to be utilized to exclude
material from discovery if the attorney-client privilege cannot be in-
voked. This exclusionary doctrine appears to be limited, however, to a
narrow class of documents prepared, according to some courts, only
after a lawsuit has been filed. 26 It does not appear, therefore, to be a
privilege that can be invoked to exclude correspondence prepared in
procuring normal corporate legal advice.
The Supreme Court's treatment of Upjohn may well mark the
establishment of a uniform set of standards governing communications
between the corporation and its attorneys. Such treatment will likely
not go beyond the issue of waiver by disclosure; however, even the ar-
ticulation of guidelines in this area will be instructive and beneficial.
12 See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
125 See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
11 Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol28/iss4/4
